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I
INTRODUCTION
In 1915, the American Association of University Professors ("AAUP")
issued a manifesto proclaiming the need for academic freedom and tenure for
professors. Critics challenged these demands in part because they claimed for
professors liberties and job security not vouchsafed to other employees. A
committee of the Association of American Colleges ("AAC"), then the leading
organization of liberal arts institutions, replied to the 1915 Declaration by
invoking the principle of subordination embedded in the employment
relationship:
It has been said that the man, to be efficient, must always come before the official. Not
only is this not true in academic life, but it is not true in any form of organized activity.
Official relationships form the circle within which individual initiative must find room
for play, and sufficient academic freedom would seem to be granted when there is no
interference within the circle first prescribed of research, thought and utterance. I
The AAC left no doubt that the power so to prescribe did not lie with the
faculty. 2 When a college president was urged some years later to provide a
hearing before he dismissed a professor, he replied, "When you want to fire a
cook, you don't go out and get a committee of the neighbors to tell you what
to do, do you?" 3
The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure,
jointly formulated with the AAC, codified the profession's claims and has
since achieved nearly universal institutional acceptance; however, the claim
Copyright © 1990 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
1. Report of the Committee of the Association of American Colleges reprinted in The Reference
Shef." Academic Freedom 83, 83-84 (H.W. Wilson, 1925) (emphasis added). This was prefaced with the
observation that: "[W]hen a new member is added to an academic staff, he, by virtue of the
acceptance of the position, is under an obligation to recognize that the freedom of the institution
must be placed before the freedom of the individual." Id at 83.
2. Id at 85 ("No way has yet been found to play the 'cello or the harp and at the same time to
direct the orchestra.").
3. Arthur 0. Lovejoy, Academic Freedom and Tenure: Rollins College Report, 19 AAUP Bull 416, 422
(1933).
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that these demands are extraordinary has continued unabated. Tenure-"this
peculiar right we claim"-has been attacked persistently on that very ground.4
And academic freedom in the broad sense espoused in the 1940 Statement,
that is, as reaching not only teaching and publication but also extramural
political utterance and intramural speech in matters of institutional policy and
action, has been similarly challenged. As one critic put it, "Why would
anyone have ever supposed that professors should have more liberty in the
workplace than anyone else?" 5 Another wrote,
I do not think that academic freedom is simply another articulation of the goals of the
labor reform movement. If it is, [house] painters ought to have the same range of
protections. . . . The question is why academics, with respect to matters not directly
related to teaching and scholarship, have a higher order of liberty in the workplace
than others.
6
What follows is an assessment of this argument from the perspective of the
history of employment practices and law. As will appear directly, most of
what may have appeared exceptional at the time of the 1940 Statement is no
longer exceptional today, as employer policies and employment law have
extended to employees in other fields much of the job protection and
workplace liberty the 1940 Statement accorded to professors. Interestingly,
the academic profession's demand for tenure and its broadly conceived scope
of workplace liberty may have anticipated the development of security and
freedom within the employment relationship in general.
II
ACADEMIC TENURE AND "TENURE-LIKE" EMPLOYER POLICIES
At the time of the 1915 Declaration, it was not generally assumed that the
employment relationship would be of long duration. Federal civil servants
had secured in 1897 the right not to be dismissed "except for just cause and
upon written charges . . . of which the accused shall have full notice and an
opportunity to make defense."' 7  But the federal sector, and public
employment more generally, represented a relatively small component of the
labor market.8 Industrial employees were commonly assumed to be in a
4. For example, Carol Stern writes: "Our [professorial] claims of privilege and separateness
do not always serve us well. During the two years of my [AAUP] presidency, I have frequently been
chided by politicians and challenged by the press to defend this peculiar right we claim-the right to
tenure." Carol Simpson Stern, Time Past and Time Future: A 75th Anniversary Address, 76 Academe 47
(1990). For the flavor of the ongoing contention surrounding tenure, see Henry Rosovsky, The
University: An Owner's Manual (W.W. Norton, 1990); Richard P. Chait & Andrew T. Ford, Beyond
Traditional Tenure (Jossey-Bass, 1982); Bardwell L. Smith, et al, The Tenure Debate (Jossey-Bass, 1973);
Commission on Tenure in Higher Education, Faculty Tenure: A Report and Recommendations (jossey-
Bass, 1973).
5. Robert F. Ladenson, Is Academic Freedom Necessary?, 5 L & Phil 54, 68 (1986).
6. Mark Yudof, Intramural Musings on Academic Freedom: A Reply to Professor Finkin, 66 Tex L Rev
1351, 1355 (1988).
7. Presidential Executive Order No 101 (July 27, 1897). See generally Paul P. Van Riper,
History of the United States Civil Service 144 (Row, Peterson, 1958).
8. Federal, state, and local governmental employees constituted about 1.8 million in a
workforce of 23 million in 1915, that is, about 8%. This number has grown until it represented
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continuous spot market for labor, in which they had to compete for their jobs
virtually day by day with the unemployed waiting at the gate. There were few
employer policies or benefits to encourage or reward long service; the handful
of firms that had adopted profit sharing systems before 1900 had abandoned
them by 1916; in 1929, only 17 percent of the firms reporting in one survey
had a plan for internal promotion. 9 One consequence was a yearly rate of
employee turnover that would be considered horrendous by contemporary
standards: 100 percent in Armour meat-packing in 1914, 370 percent at Ford
in 1913.10 Another result was a kind of footloose independence, or a
willingness (and ability) on the part of employees to quit.
Absent express agreement upon a fixed duration of employment, or terms
such as an annual salary for middle-class white-collar employees that would
imply such duration," I the relationship was assumed to be one of employment
at will: the employee was free to quit at any time, and the employer was
equally free to discharge at any time and for any reason. The idea of
"permanent" employment was considered so unusual, so unlikely, as to
require consideration additional to the performance of service to render the
promise contractually binding; 12 and often the judicial understanding of
"permanence" misidentified a commitment not to dismiss without just cause
as one of lifetime employment, akin to a sinecure granted in return for a
release of employer liability for an on-the-job injury. 13
After World War II, the emergence of organized labor helped refashion
these fundamental assumptions governing the employment relationship.
Organized labor's consolidation in the mass production industries guaranteed
that incumbent workers would not compete day by day for their jobs with the
labor force at large. Workers would be retained by commitments to job
security, a wide array of company benefits, and internal lines of progression
and promotion. Nonunion firms, in order to remain nonunion, emulated the
pattern in unionized industry. In 1929, 2 percent of industrial firms had
pension plans; in 1957, 73 percent of industrial firms with more than 250
employees provided them. 14 In 1929, 34 percent of those firms had
personnel departments; in 1963, 81 percent did.' 5
Nowhere is the shift from the unstable, market-oriented employment system to the
system of internal labor markets-and to the assumption of stability-better illustrated
than in the dissemination of employee policy handbooks and manuals. In the
about 18% of the 1970 workforce. United States Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the
United States 137 (1975).
9. Archibald Cox, et al, Labor Law 514 (Foundation, 1991).
10. Id.
11. Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United States and
England: A Historical Analysis, 5 Comp Labor Law 85 (Winter 1982).
12. See generally Annotation, Comment Note-Validity and Duration of Contract Purporting to be for
Permanent Employment, 60 ALR 3d 226 (1974).
13. 1 Howard Specter & Matthew W. Finkin, Individual Employment Law and Litigation § 2.09
(Michie, 1989) ("Specter & Finkin").
14. Matthew W. Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work: Employer Policies and Contract Law, 1986 Wis
L Rev 733, 741.
15. Id.
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nineteenth century the employer's work rules, if not brutish, were short; as much
information as the employee needed to know was ordinarily conveyed by the foreman.
As late as 1935, only 13% of industrial firms had adopted employee rulebooks. The
bureaucratization of work, however, enmeshes the worker in a "web of rules" and it
requires that the rules be known. By 1948, 30% of industrial firms had adopted
employee handbooks. A 1979 survey of 6,000 companies revealed that employee
handbooks were distributed by approximately 75% of the companies responding.
Notably, the employer's personnel policies were included in 85% of the handbooks
given to production workers, and in 90% of those given to office, clerical, and lower
level exempt employees. 16
Many of these policies contain rules providing for progressive discipline,
fair evaluation, and just cause to discharge-rules, that is, that replicate in
form the protections afforded by collective bargaining agreements, in part to
maintain a stable complement of satisfied and therefore productive
employees, and in part to avoid unionization. One consequence is the
widespread expectation-and reality-of job security in a great many
nonunionized jobs.1 7 Thus, the basic concept that after a period of probation
the employee will not be dismissed except for just cause is, as a practical
matter, no longer peculiar to the academic profession. It has become the
norm for classified civil servants, for employees under collective bargaining
agreements, and for a great many nonunionized employees as well.
Nor is tenure, as a legally enforceable obligation, exceptional. When Clark
Byse considered the legal status of academic tenure a generation ago, it was
not entirely clear that tenure would be legally enforceable. He identified four
unresolved and potentially problematic questions: (1) whether institutional
rules governing tenure and dismissal, in the absence of express incorporation
into a contract of employment, would be understood to supply those terms;
(2) whether the doctrine of mutuality of obligation would render tenure
legally illusory; (3) whether an institutional disclaimer of contractual status for
its rules -would be given legal effect; and (4) whether a provision reserving to
the governing board final power to decide if cause to dismiss were shown
would preclude judicial review.18 A further question is what constitutes just
cause for dismissal, and how it should be determined. As discussed in Parts
IIA-E, all these questions have been more recently addressed by the courts.
And, in answering them, the courts have developed a useful dialogue between
the law of academic tenure and the law of individual (nonunionized)
employment security. This dialogue demonstrates that tenure is not the only
form of employment security that is legally enforceable.
A. The Role of Institutional Policies and Practices
In what has become the leading decision regarding faculty employment in
higher education, Greene v. Howard University,' 9 judge Carl McGowan observed
16. Id at 742-43.
17. Robert E. Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 72 Am Econ Rev 716 (1982).
18. Clark Byse & Louis Joughin, Tenure in American Higher Education (Cornell Univ Press, 1959)
("Byse &Joughin").
19. 412 F2d 1128 (DC Cir 1969).
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that faculty employment contracts "comprehend as essential parts of
themselves the hiring policies and practices of the University as embodied in
its employment regulations and customs." 20 All the terms and conditions of
professorial employment cannot be spelled out in the letter or notice of
appointment-or even, for those institutions that use them, in a document
expressly captioned as a "contract" of employment. The rules by which
institutions govern themselves, including institutional commitments to
academic freedom and tenure, as well as the procedures for according and
terminating tenure, customarily are contained in a compendium of
institutional policy statements, usually captioned as a Faculty Handbook or
the like. The courts have treated these policies and procedures as contractual
commitments, virtually without discussion. 2' There is nothing exceptional in
this. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, employees were held to be
bound by the employer's posted rules providing for forfeitures, fines, or other
terms and conditions of employment. 22  However, the contemporary
contractual status of employee manuals and handbooks issued by industrial
employers has been strongly contested. 23 A majority of jurisdictions have
rightly recognized these policy manuals as stating contractual terms, though
they have divided upon whether promulgation alone is sufficient-as in higher
education-or whether express employee reliance must be shown. The
decisions in the minority of jurisdictions rejecting contractual status have
variously accepted one or another of the arguments that concerned Byse, and
are discussed further here, as potentially vitiating the legal enforceability of
academic tenure; these decisions are not legally defensible.
B. Mutuality of Obligation
A tenured professor is free to quit merely upon submission of a timely
resignation. The institution, however, if it wishes to discharge a tenured
professor, customarily must proceed through a trial-like hearing before a
faculty hearing committee. The respective obligations are therefore unequal,
and there is some authority in the law of employment-even relatively
modern authority-for the proposition that, where the reciprocal obligations
of employer and employee are not equal, the contract is unenforceable for
20. Id at 1135.
21. In addition to the cases cited elsewhere in this piece, see Rose v Elmhurst College, 62 I1 App 3d
824, 379 NE2d 791 (1978); Mendez v Trustees of Boston University, 362 Mass 353, 285 NE2d 446 (1972);
Griffin v Board of Trustees of St. Mary's College, 258 Md 276, 265 A2d 757 (1970); Bruno v Detroit Inst. of
Technology, 36 Mich App 61, 193 NW2d 322 (1971). Compare Holland v Kennedy, 548 S2d 982, 986
(Miss 1989) (applying industrial case law to Belhaven College's faculty manual and concluding that
the plaintiff administrator may introduce "evidence of past employment practices of the college, oral
representations made to him by agents of his employer as well as the policy handbook to support his
claim that his employment was for a definite term").
22. H. G. Wood, A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant § 94 (Bancroft-Whitney, 2d ed 1886).
The employee would not be bound in the absence of knowledge of the rule. Collins v New England
Iron Co., I 15 Mass 23 (1874); Bradley v Salmon Falls Mfg. Co., 30 NH 487 (1855); Hamilton v Love, 152
Ind 641, 53 NE 181 (1899).
23. Specter & Finkin at §§ 1.28-1.72 (cited in note 13).
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want of "mutuality of obligation. ' 24 The doctrine, as so framed, makes no
sense; so long as the employer and employee are both bound by the
employer's rules, it should be irrelevant that there is no precise equality of
obligation. At least one court has rejected the claim that academic tenure is
unenforceable on this ground.2 5 The weight of modern authority in
employment law has declined to hold employer policies assuring job security
unenforceable based on lack of mutual obligation, 26 in one case relying
expressly on an analogy to tenure. 27
C. Disclaimer
An employer may wish to secure the benefit of rules assuring fair
treatment of employees while simultaneously seeking to avoid having to
subject itself to litigation about its adherence to them. In Greene v.Howard
University, the court confronted such a disclaimer contained in rules providing
for timely notice of nonrenewal of appointment. Judge McGowan noted the
university's argument that "what it gave with one hand it took away
simultaneously with the other."-28 This it could not do:
Contracts are written, and are to be read, by reference to the norms of conduct and
expectations founded upon them. This is especially true of contracts in and among a
community of scholars, which is what a university is. The readings of the market place
are not invariably apt in this non-commercial context.
29
The first sentence has it exactly right. Indeed, an entire body of law has
developed, consistent with the general law of custom and usage, founded on
the proposition that the "norms and expectations" of the academic profession
give meaning to institutional rules. 30 But Judge McGowan's latter two
sentences give pause to the extent they suggest that the court's refusal to give
effect to the disclaimer was for a reason particular to the academic setting. If
Greene is good law-as it is-in the face of decisions that would give effect to
disclaimers in employee handbooks, the case would be an instance of
professorial exceptionalism. One cannot find a principled basis for
24. See, for example, Buian vJ.L. Jacobs & Co., 428 F2d 531, 533 (7th Cir 1970); Shaw v S.S.
Kresge Co., 167 Ind App 1, 328 NE2d 775 (1975); Koch v Illinois Power Co., 175 Il1 App 3d 248, 529
NE2d 281 (1988).
25. Collins v Parsons College, 203 NW2d 594 (Iowa 1973).
26. Specter & Finkin § 1.06 (cited in note 13).
27. The federal district court reasoned:
Although this idea is not easily understood in the context of industrial employment, it is
similar to the concept of tenure in the academic community. When a college grants a
professor tenure, it is giving away its right to terminate the professor at will. The college
usually retains the power to discharge the professor for specified causes. But so long as the
professor faithfully performs his duties he usually has job security. Even though the
professor is free to leave and his term of employment is indefinite, tenure rights are
generally viewed as enforceable contract rights.
Barger v General Elec. Co., 599 F Supp 1156, 1161 n6 (WD Va 1984).
28. Greene v Howard University, 412 F2d 1128, 1134 (DC Cir 1969).
29. Id at 1135.
30. Id at 1133-34 n7. See also Browzin v Catholic University, 527 F2d 843 (DC Cir 1975); Krotkoffv
Goucher College, 585 F2d 675 (4th Cir 1978); Drans v Providence College, 383 A2d 1033 (RI 1978);Jimenez
v Almodovar, 650 F2d 363 (1st Cir 1981); McConnell v Howard University, 818 F2d 58 (DC Cir 1987).
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distinguishing a professor from a painter in terms of an employer's ability to
declare its internal rules unenforceable against itself. However, there is
abundant precedent in the law of individual employment that denies an
employer the power to declare its obligations an illusion. 3' Greene stands for
the proposition that an employer cannot take away with one hand what it gave
with the other; and if that is so, it ought to be applicable in both professorial
and nonprofessorial settings. 32
D. Finality and Preclusion of Judicial Review
A university's rules may reserve "final" decisional authority in dismissal
cases to the institution's governing board. As Byse noted, it could be argued
that such a reservation would work a preclusion of judicial review, akin to a
participant's submission to a contest in which "the decision of the judges will
be final." Such an approach, however, would produce the same result as a
disclaimer; it would render the university's trustees, the final authority for the
employer, judges in their own cause. 33 There is authority in employment law
31. Thus an employer may not enter upon a contract of fixed duration while reserving to itself
the power to terminate earlier for no reason. See, for example, Carter v Bradlee, 245 AD 49, 280
NYS2d 368, aff'd 269 NY 664, 200 NE 48 (1936) (followed in Rotherbergv Lincoln Farm Camp, Inc., 755
F2d 1017 (2d Cir 1985)). See also Yazujian vJ. Rich Steers, Inc., 195 Misc 694, 89 NYS2d 551 (Sup Ct
1949); Dallas Hotel v Lackey, 203 SW2d 557 (Tex Civ App 1947); King v Control Systematologists, Inc., 479
S2d 955 (La App 1985). An employer's reservation of "sole discretion" to pay a commission may not
defeat an obligation to pay. See, for example, Allen D. Shadron, Inc. v Cole, 101 Ariz 122, 416 P2d 555,
aff'd 101 Ariz 341, 419 P2d 520 (1966); Spencer v General Elec. Co., 243 F2d 934 (8th Cir 1957);
Tymrshare, Inc. v Covell, 727 F2d 1145 (DC Cir 1984). Similarly, an employer may not obligate itself to
pay a bonus while disclaiming a legal obligation to pay. See, for example, Wellington v Con P. Curran
Printing Co., 216 Mo App 358, 268 SW2d 396 (1925); George A. Fuller Co. v Brown, 15 F2d 672 (4th Cir
1926); Molbey v Hunter Hosiery, Inc., 102 NH 422, 158 A2d 288 (1960); Ellis v Emhart Manuf Co., 150
Conn 501, 191 A2d 546 (1963); Patterson v Brooks, 285 Ala 349, 232 S2d 598 (1970); Oiler v Dayton
Reliable Tool & Mfg. Co., 42 Ohio App 2d 26, 326 NE2d 691 (1974); Cinelli v American Home Products
Corp., 785 F2d 264 (10th Cir 1986); Goudie v HNG Oil Co., 711 SW2d 716 (Tex App 1986). Nor may
an employer promise benefits while disclaiming a legal obligation to pay, see, for example, Tilbert v
Eagle Lock Co., 116 Conn 357, 165 A 205 (1933); Mabley & Carew Co. v Borden, 129 Ohio St 375, 195
NE 697 (1935); Psutka v Michigan Alkali Co., 274 Mich 318, 264 NW2d 385 (1936); Schofield v Zion's Co-
op Merchantile Institution, 85 Utah 281, 39 P2d 342 (1934).
32. Jones v Central Peninsula General Hospital, 779 P2d 783, 789 (Alaska 1989).
33. As Byse cautioned:
Not many trustees can be expected to take a completely independent and objective position
if dismissal proceedings are instituted by the president, for it must be remembered that the
president was appointed by the trustees and in a very real sense is their representative. If
the president, perhaps after consultation with the chairman or executive committee of the
governing board, alleges that the acts committed by the teacher disqualify him from
continuing as a member of the faculty, it would not be surprising if most trustees were to
conclude that the president correctly interpreted the termination criteria. If in turn the
reviewing court must defer to the governing board's interpretation of termination criteria,
the tenure principle could be seriously undermined by a parochial or prejudiced president.
Byse &Joughin at 109 (cited in note 18) (footnotes omitted).
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disallowing the preclusive effect of such provisions;3 4 and, more recently,
preclusion has been rejected in higher education.3 5
E. Cause to Discharge and Deference to Employer Judgment
Where, by individual contract, the employer has bound itself for a term of
employment, and so by law cannot dismiss except for good cause,
adjudication is necessary in contested cases to determine what conduct the
employee engaged in and whether the conduct justified discharge. This
would seem to be so whether or not the just cause obligation was contained in
the individual contract or in a statement of employer policy. But this area is
not altogether free of confusion.
Where tenure is held in a public institution by virtue of state law or of
institutional policy authorized by law, some jurisdictions have held that a
decision of the trustees to dismiss, challenged as a matter of state
administrative law, is to be reviewed judicially only under a standard of "loose
ratiomality." 36 In fact, even in a recent dismissal case in a private university,
where the faculty hearing committee found no cause to discharge a professor
of twenty years' service on grounds of alleged incompetence, the trustees
dismissed nevertheless, and the appellate court seems to have assumed that
the dismissal, challenged as a breach of the individual's tenure contract,
would be reviewed as if it were subject to the same loose rationality
standard. 3 7
Moreover, some courts have taken an analogous approach where an
industrial employer's commitment to job security arises under the employer's
rules rather than under a contract of express duration. In Oregon and
Washington, the test is whether the employer had a good faith belief that the
facts relied upon justified the discharge; there is no independent fact-
finding. 38 These courts have reasoned that because the rules are self-limiting,
and are unilaterally adopted by employers, the meaning intended by the
employer, "the drafter," is controlling: "[Tihere is no reason to infer that the
employer intended to surrender its power to determine whether facts
constituting cause for termination exist." 39 California allows a role for the
34. The Michigan Supreme Court observed regarding the dismissal of a steamboat captain that,
in the absence of a finality clause, "We think there is neither reason nor law for making employers, in
such cases, final judges in their own behalf of the propriety of dismissing their employees during
their term of employment. They cannot avoid the responsibility which attaches to dismissals without
actual cause." Jones v Graham & Morton Transp. Co., 51 Mich 539, 541 (1883). For the treatment of
expressed finality clauses, see In the Matter of Arbitration between Cross & Brown Co., 4 AD2d 501, 167
NYS2d 573 (1957); Burger vJan Garment Co., 52 Luz L Reg 33 (Pa Corn Pleas 1962).
35. Manes v Dallas Baptist College, 638 SW2d 143 (Tex App 1982) McConnell, 818 F2d 58.
36. Harris v Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 405 Mass 515, 542 NE2d 261, 268 (1989). Chief
Judge Liacos was evidently troubled by the standard. Id at 267-68.
37. Olivier v Xavier University, 553 S2d 1004 (La App 1989), cert denied, 556 S2d 1279 (La 1990).
38. Simpson v Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or 96, 643 P2d 1276 (1982); Baldwin v Sisters of Providence
In Washington, Inc., 112 Wash 2d 127, 769 P2d 298 (1989).
39. Baldwin, 112 Wash 2d at 138, 769 P2d at 304, quoting Simpson, 293 Or at 100, 643 P2d at
1278. This reasoning neglects even to mention the common maxim that contractual ambiguities are
to be resolved against the interests of the drafting party.
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finder of fact, but has stressed that the employer must be allowed to set its
own standards of performance, and that the question for the jury-once the
facts have been found-is to determine whether a discharge for the reasons
found is within the bounds of discretion accorded to the employer. 40
The issue of the appropriate standard of review was squarely presented in
McConnell v. Howard University.4 1 McConnell, a tenured professor of
mathematics, refused to continue teaching a class in which an obstreperous
student had enrolled unless the student apologized (for calling him a racist)
or the administration either removed her from the class or took some other
remedial action. Instead, the administration sought to dismiss Professor
McConnell for neglect of duty. The faculty hearing committee found no basis
for dismissal; nevertheless, the trustees discharged. The professor sued for
breach of contract, and the university administration argued that the trustees'
decision should be given deference, either by analogy to the scope of review
in the public sector or because of the "special nature" of the university. The
District of Columbia circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Harry Edwards,
rejected the administration's argument and rather bluntly.
If we were to adopt a view limiting judicial review over the substance of the Board of
Trustees' decision, we would be allowing one of the parties to the contract to
determine whether the contract had been breached. This would make a sham of the
parties' contractual tenure arrangement.
On remand, the trial court must consider de novo the appellant's breach of contract
claims; no special deference is due the Board of Trustees once the case is properly
before the court for resolution of the contract dispute. 42
As in any other contract case, there must be a "de novo determination of the
facts and of the application of the facts to the terms of the contract." 43
McConnell represents the better view.44
Turning to the question of what constitutes cause to dismiss, it was not
contested that Professor McConnell refused to perform an assigned duty; to
the district court, that put an end to the matter.45 But the court of appeals
held that that question "must be construed in keeping with general usage and
custom at the University and within the academic community," 46 noting cases
that have relied upon AAUP standards as evidencing the custom and usage of
the academic community. The court noted that the faculty hearing
committee's findings suggested that Professor McConnell's actions did not
constitute neglect of professional responsibility under all the circumstances in
the case, and that his action might bejustifiable in light of the administration's
40. Pugh v See's Candies, Inc., 203 Cal App 3d 743, 250 Cal Rptr 195 (1988); Wilkerson v Wells Fargo
Bank, 212 Cal App 3d 1217, 261 Cal Rptr 185 (1989).
41. 818 F2d 58 (DC Cir 1987), rev'g 621 F Supp 327 (DC 1985).
42. 818 F2d at 68.
43. Id at 70 n14.
44. See, for example, Danzer v Professional Insurers, Inc., 101 NM 178, 679 P2d 1276 (1984); Davis
v Tucson Ariz. Boys Choir Soc'y, 137 Ariz App 228, 669 P2d 1005 (1983) (rejecting employer good faith
as a defense). See generally Specter & Finkin at § 4.13 (cited in note 13).
45. 621 F Supp 327, 331 (DC 1985).
46. 818 F2d at 64.
Page 357: Summer 1990]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
abnegation of a responsibility it arguably had to the professor vis-a-vis the
student.
The court's approach does not establish a different set of rules for
professors than for other employees. The law regarding the determination of
sufficient cause to discharge has always rested upon the nature of the
particular employment. A factory superintendent's refusal to obey an order
of the corporation's board of directors to present himself before them might
not supply a basis for discharge, grounded in the common law duty of
obedience, because a court should consider not only "the reasonableness and
importance of the order when given," but also "the degree of discretion
entrusted to the employee or required by the nature of [the] work." 47 "An
employee's lack of wit or charm," one court more recently opined, "is more
tolerable in the accounting or shipping department than in the sales or
personnel department. ' 4 And it is black letter law that relevant customs and
usages inform the meaning of contract terms.
In sum, the principle of tenure, that is, of a right not to be dismissed
except for just cause, as a mutually engendered expectation and as an
enforceable obligation, is not peculiar to the academic world. What remains
unique to academic tenure, and defensible in terms of the special relationship
of tenure to academic freedom, are the requirement of a hearing by one's
academic peers before the dismissal may occur, and the limitation the tenure
obligation independently imposes upon the institution's ability to reallocate
resources. These are important but subsidiary features of the principal
obligation; the obligation itself may no longer be criticized on any ground of
special pleading.
III
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND WORKPLACE LIBERTY
The 1940 Statement recognized academic freedom as extending to
professors simultaneously as ". . . citizen[s]. . . . member[s] of a learned
profession, and . . . officer[s] of an educational institution."-4 9 Thus, it
accorded the freedom of utterance due a citizen in the larger body politic; the
47. Crabtree v Bay State Felt Co., 227 Mass 68, 116 NE 535 (1917). When a foreman was
discharged for absenting himself for a day on pressing personal business over the objection of his
employer, the Supreme Court of Michigan held it to be a jury question whether such disobedience
constituted cause to dismiss, observing:
In such employments as involve a higher order of services, and some degree of
discretion and judgment, it would in our opinion be unauthorized and unreasonable to
regard skilled mechanics or other employees, as subject to the whim and caprice of their
employers or as deprived of all right of action to such a degree as to be liable to lose their
places upon every omission to obey orders, involving no serious consequences.
Shaver v Ingham, 58 Mich 649, 654, 26 NW 162, 165 (1886).
48. Sherriffv Revell, Inc., 162 Cal App 3d 297, 211 Cal Rptr 465, 471 (1985). See generally
Specter & Finkin at § 4.13 (cited in note 13).
49. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure ("1940 Statement"), in Policy
Documents and Reports 3, 4 (AAUP, 1990) ("1990 AAUP Redbook"); see Appendix B, 53 L & Contemp
Probs 407 (Summer 1990). As Henry Wriston, President of Brown University and the AAC's chief
negotiator, put it in presenting the document to the AAC, "The new statement.., recognizes the tri-
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freedom due a member of a discipline to teach, research, and publish; and the
freedom of speech on any matter of intramural concern due an "officer," or,
as Henry Rosovsky has more recently put it, a "shareholder" 50 of the
institution.
A. Political Speech
The extension of academic freedom to political utterance has been
powerfully criticized by Professor William Van Alstyne.5 t One cannot, he
argues, abstract a liberty for utterance unrelated to vocation from a doctrine
grounded in the need to protect vocational utterance. From this perspective,
the negotiators of the 1940 Statement, acting out of a laudable impulse and at
a time when the political expression of public employees was not
constitutionally protected, nevertheless sought the wrong shelter. Effectively,
they separated out a special claim for academics from what should have been a
general claim of civil liberty. Moreover, to categorize professorial political
utterance as an aspect of academic freedom is, Van Alstyne argues, necessarily
to hold it to a professional standard of care-as the 1940 Statement seems
rather straightforwardly to do 52 -that results in academics having potentially
less protection for their political speech than other employees. The 1940
Statement's special claim of protection is no longer necessary, even as a
prudential factor, inasmuch as the Supreme Court has extended the
protection of the first amendment to the political utterances of public
employees in Pickering v.Board of Education.53
The force of Van Alstyne's argument is illustrated, if unintentionally, in
John Silber defense of action he had taken while a dean at the University of
Texas to deny the reappointment of a young professor of philosophy. The
young academic had given a political speech on the steps of the state capitol
before a crowd containing a large number of students, and had, in Silber's
terms, "willingly and knowingly told a lie in order to make a rhetorical
point ' ' 54 by asserting the existence of concentration camps in the state. This,
to Silber, was "a clear case of poisoning the well in the marketplace of ideas,
and a gross betrayal of academic freedom through gross academic
partite relationship ..... " Henry M. Wriston, Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in 25 AAUP Bull
333 (1939).
50. Rosovsky, The University at 165 (cited in note 4).
51. See William Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil
Liberty, in Edmund L. Pincoffs, ed, The Concept of Academic Freedom 59 (Univ of Texas Press, 1975)
("Specific Theory").
52. The 1940 Statement provides in pertinent part that when the academic speaks as a citizen
his special position in the community imposes special obligations. As a man of learning and
an educational officer, he should remember that the public mayjudge his profession and his
institution by his utterances. Hence he should at all times be accurate, should exercise
appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make
every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman.
1940 Statement at 4; Appendix B at 407-08 (cited in note 49).
53. 391 US 563 (1968).
54. John Silber, Poisoning the Wells of Academe, 43 Encounter 30, 37 (1974).
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irresponsibility.- 55 On those grounds, Dean Silber decided not to reappoint
the instructor. "IT]he academic," Silber argued, "neither needs nor deserves
greater protection for his political freedom than that afforded the ordinary
citizen. There is (and in my opinion, should be) a price for glory." 56
But the philosophy professor was not accorded the same protection by
Dean Silber that the law accords to other public employees. Pickering supplies
a two-part test for public employee speech. First, the speech must itself be
upon a matter of public concern to the larger body politic. Second, the
speech must be weighed in a balance against the employer's need to maintain
the discipline of the workforce and to ensure harmony with superiors and
among coworkers.
The young academic's speech was on a matter of public concern and did
not bring him into conflict with his immediate superiors or coworkers; indeed,
his departmental colleagues voted to recommend his renewal, a
recommendation Dean Silber rejected. Had a house painter employed by the
university been dismissed for making the same political harangue, the
university could not have defended itself against first amendment attack.
Dean Silber extended the claim of academic freedom to the young instructor's
political speech, and then took that extension to impose a standard of care as
to the accuracy of his statements; the extension would grant the instructor less
political freedom than the hypothetical house painter.
It is far from clear, however, that the young philosopher had fallen afoul of
the profession's norm for political expression. Before Pickering, the AAUP's
Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure reconsidered the
appropriate standard of institutional sanction for political speech under the
1940 Statement and concluded:
The controlling principle is that a faculty member's expression of opinion as a citizen
cannot constitute grounds for dismissal unless it clearly demonstrates the faculty
member's unfitness for his position. Extramural utterances rarely bear upon the
faculty member's fitness for his position. Moreover, a final decision should take into
account the faculty member's entire record as a teacher and scholar. 57
And the Pickering court was at pains later to observe:
What we do have before us is a case in which a teacher has made erroneous public
statements upon issues then currently the subject of public attention, which are critical
of his ultimate employer but which are neither shown nor can be presumed to have in
any way either impeded the teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the
classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally.
58
55. Id.
56. Id at 39.
57. Committee A, Statement on Extramural Utterances, in 1990 AAUP Redbook at 58 (cited in note
49).
58. 391 US at 572-73 (footnote omitted). It went on to illustrate and emphasize the point in a
note:
[T]his case does not present a situation in which a teacher's public statements are so without
foundation as to call into question his fitness to perform his duties in the classroom. In such
a case, of course, the statements would merely be evidence of the teacher's general competence, or lack
thereof and not an independent basis for dismissal.
Id at 573 n5 (emphasis added).
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The constitutional standard embraced in the emphasized portion of the
opinion59 seems congruent with the gloss placed on the 1940 Statement by
the AAUP. Consequently, a singular incident of knowing misrepresentation
as part of a patently radical political harangue would not be expected to
provide cause to inquire into the young instructor's professional fitness, Dean
Silber's decision to the contrary notwithstanding. At a minimum, the
seemingly perverse reversal of protections Van Alstyne contemplated would
appear to be obviated by the Court's conflation of the professional and
constitutional tests; this is not to say that the test itself is without difficulty.60
More important, the professional standard may at one point be more
protective than the first amendment as currently construed. The Court has
stressed that the impairment of workplace discipline and the creation of
"disharmony" with coworkers 6' are factors to be weighed in the balance, and
at least theoretically, may deprive the utterance of constitutional protection.
The constitutional question whether a sufficient level of disharmony would
justify the dismissal of an employee even for speaking dispassionately and
accurately to issues of public concern remains unresolved. 62 But the
profession has understood that sharp, even violent, disagreement with the
content of the utterance cannot supply grounds for discharge if the
expression is otherwise consistent with the exercise of academic freedom. A
professor's outspokenness in defense (or criticism) of efforts to legalize
homosexual relations; to equate Zionism with racism; to urge the
transportation of the Palestinian population; to suppress (or secure) the
availability of abortion or pornography; to assert the genetically transmitted
intellectual inferiority (or superiority) of a particular race; and the like-
expression, in other words, that fires deep contemporary passions, is not
59. See note 58.
60. Professor Van Alstyne has been critical of the test. William Van Aistyne, The Constitutional
Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 Duke LJ 841, 854.
61. Pickering, 391 US at 570-73; Connick v Myers, 461 US 138, 152-53 (1983); Rankin v McPherson,
483 US 378, 388 (1987).
62. In National Gay Task Force v Board of Education, 729 F2d 1270 (10th Cir 1984) aff'd, 470 US
903 (1985), the Tenth Circuit struck down on overbreadth grounds portions of a statute that
provided for the refusal to hire school teachers who "advocate" homosexual activity in a manner
such that prospective co-workers may become aware of it. On appeal, the Board of Education argued
that a limitation, which required that the advocacy have an "adverse effect" on coworkers, saved the
statute: "When [the advocacy] comes to the attention of other teachers or co-workers, it is likely to
produce sufficient controversy, suspicion, and mistrust so as to threaten employee discipline, co-
worker harmony, and that personal loyalty and confidence requisite to particularly close employee
relationships." Appellant's Brief at 36, quoted in AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae at 12, 470 US 903
(No 83-2030). The AAUP took sharp issue with the argument:
An advocate upon any controversial subject could be disqualified not because the speech
fell afoul of any test of lawlessness, not because it reflected any want of scholarship, and not
because it lacked in moderation or restraint in any way, but because one's prospective
colleagues or superiors found the advocate's position upon a general question of public
policy too "controversial" and so "disharmonious." But to make appointment contingent
upon the degree of approval of one's social, economic, or political views by one's co-
workers or supervisors is to eviscerate the First Amendment.
Id at 13-14. Ominously, the Tenth Circuit's decision was affirmed by an equally divided Court. 470
US 903.
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subject to sanction based upon the depth and intensity of collegial sentiment
contrary to the ideas expressed.
From an historical perspective, the demand for freedom of political
expression and activity in the employment relationship, as an aspect not only
of citizenship but of status, is not unprecedented. In the early days of the
Republic, employer efforts to control the political behavior of employees were
strenuously and sometimes violently resisted as a threat to democracy and an
affront to artisanal independence, in appeals straightforwardly to the
solidarity of the "mechanical class." '63
Most states now forbid by legislation employer attempts to control
employees' political activity, and some insulate political speech and
association generally from employer reprisal. 64 In addition, the emerging tort
of discharge for reasons violating public policy 6 5 has been extended to
encompass the dismissal of a manager for refusal to support his employer's
lobbying effort on behalf of a bill favorable to the company; 66 the dismissal of
an employee for protesting the unauthorized use of his name in the
company's lobbying effort;67 and the discharge of a bank executive for the
content of testimony he gave a committee of the United States Senate.6 8 In
other words, the law of employment may be edging toward a general public
policy forbidding employers from interfering in employee political speech and
activity. If this is so, and putting the question of standards aside, it would not
appear that professors have claimed a higher order of workplace liberty than
that claimed by others.
B. Speech on Workplace Issues
The profession has subsumed as an aspect of academic freedom
intramural speech on any matter of academic interest-that is, speech made as
a "shareholder" in the institution. That formulation has been challenged by
63. In 1798, the "mechanics" of Baltimore protested vehemently about a Federalist employer
who would hire no men opposed to his candidate. They published a statement in the press: "The
statement claimed that 'unwarrantable and degrading means' had been used to manipulate the
mechanics' vote, that these 'base designs' must be frustrated, and that the mechanics 'have and will
maintain an opinion of our own.' " Charles G. Steffen, The Mechanics of Baltimore: Workers and Politics
in the Age of Revolution 1763-1812, 162 (Univ of Illinois Press, 1984). Howard Rock recounts a series
of such incidents-and protests-in New York City around the turn of the century, including a
broadside of 1808: "Fellow citizens - LET us support our independence! If we are Mechanics,
Labourers and Artizans - Why should we surrender our opinions and our rights to the arbitrary
mandate of a Tory Employer, and that employer, perhaps a foreign emissary!" Howard Rock,
Artisans of the New Republic: The Tradesmen of New York City in the Age of Jefferson 54 (New York Univ
Press, 1979) ("Artisans"). Similar employer action was later to occur, especially in the presidential
election of 1896. See Walter Licht, Working for the Railroad: The Organization of Work in the Nineteenth
Century 230-31 (Princeton Univ Press, 1983); Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment 286 (Oxford
Univ Press, 1978).
64. Specter & Finkin at § 10.25 (cited in note 13).
65. Id at §§ 10.33-10.48.
66. Novosel v Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F2d 894 (3d Cir 1983) (applying Pennsylvania law).
67. Chavez v Manville Products Corp., 108 NM 643, 777 P2d 371 (1989).
68. Bishop v Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Wichita, 908 F2d 658 (10th Cir 1990) (applying
Oklahoma law).
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Dean Mark Yudof.69 Unlike Van Alstyne's treatment of professorial political
speech, which he would shelter under a more generous rubric of civil liberty,
and which he would extend to private institutions under that head, 70 Yudof's
criticism is not solely a matter of the derivation of the claim. Even had the
profession claimed academic freedom only for disciplinary discourse, and
coupled it, following the line of Van Alstyne's argument, with an assertion of
academic civil liberty for nondisciplinary discourse, Yudof's question-why
academics should have workplace liberties higher than those conceded to
others-would seem to persist.
The question assumes that other occupations have failed to propound, and
secure, any analogous freedom. A fuller examination of that question is
called for, and for that an historical perspective is essential.
In the pre-industrial, artisanal world of the early Republic, the implied
obligations of obedience and respectfulness owed by servant to master were,
at least for the highly skilled, irrelevant. Journeymen worked under little
supervision; and, for some, any supervision was not to be endured. Paid by
the piece, artisans often came and went as they pleased. 71 Drinking on the job
was asserted not only as a matter of custom, but as of right. 72 Independence
from authority was insisted upon. "If a master said a word that wasn't
deserved," Andrew Mayhew was told by a hatmaker in 1850, "a journeyman
would put on his coat and walk out." 7 3 If a word could capture the spirit of
these craftsmen, it would be "manliness." As David Montgomery explains:
Few words enjoyed more popularity in the nineteenth century than this honorific, with
all its connotations of dignity, respectability, defiant egalitarianism, and patriarchal
male supremacy. The worker who merited it refused to cower before the foreman's
glares-in fact, often would not work at all when a boss was watching.74
By the time of the 1915 Declaration, however, much had changed. The
small artisanal workshop had been replaced by the factory. Many of the
traditional crafts had become totally deskilled; the craftsmen were replaced by
69. Musings at 1355 (cited in note 6). Interestingly, action taken not as a metaphorical but as an
actual shareholder of an employing corporation has been held in several jurisdictions to be insulated
from employer reprisal. Specter & Finkin at § 10.44 (cited in note 13).
70. Specific Theory at 81 (cited in note 51).
71. See generally Daniel T. Rodgers, The Work Ethic in Industrial America 1850-1920 (Univ of
Chicago Press, 1974); Stephen J. Ross, Workers on the Edge: Work, Leisure, and Politics in Industrializing
Cincinnati, 1788-1890 (Columbia Univ Press, 1985); Jonathan Prude, The Coming of Industrial Order:
Town and Factory Life in Rural Massachusetts, 1810-1860 (Cambridge Univ Press, 1983); David
Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor (Cambridge Univ Press, 1987).
72. See, for example, Rock, Artisans at 53 (cited in note 63); David Bensman, The Practice of
Solidarity: American Hat Finishers in the Nineteenth Century 53 (Univ of Illinois Press, 1985) ("The Practice
of Solidarity ").
73. Bensman, The Practice of Solidarity at 53 (cited in note 72). The spirit was captured in Robert
Rollins' song, "The Jovial Hatter":
We unto no bosses humble
When our trade begins to flag
When they begin to growl and grumble
We resent and give the bag [quit]
Id.
74. David Montgomery, JVorkers' Control in America: Studies in the History of Work, Technology, and
Labor Struggles 13 (Cambridge Univ Press, 1979).
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semiskilled machine operators, who were subject to industrial demands of
punctuality and discipline, enforced by fines, forfeitures, harsh words, and
summary dismissal. In some employments, the regulation of even private life
could be far-reaching. 75
At the same time, however, the academic profession was emerging from
the era of the "Old-Time College" 76-where professing was a brief interlude
for the young bent upon a clerical career, or for the old in a case of downward
mobility, and where institutions were more concerned with doctrinal fidelity
and social acceptability than the advancement and testing of truth-to the
"Age of the University," 77 collectively to demand its freedom in 1915. While,
in other words, artisans were becoming workers,78 and, in the process, losing
their traditional independence, college and university teachers were
developing into a profession seeking to establish theirs. Thus Yudof is
partially correct: the claims of freedom of speech on intramural policy and
action codified in 1940 may appear remarkable when measured by the
practices of much unskilled and semiskilled factory labor of the time. But the
claim was modest measured by the practices of artisanal employment in the
early to mid-nineteenth century.
Nor is the profession's demand unique even in terms of law. To be sure,
speech in the public sector in connection with workplace disputes that do not
implicate any matter of "political, social, or other concern" to the larger
community is not constitutionally protected. But under the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA"), enacted only a few years before the 1940 Statement
was adopted, speech connected to workplace issues and disputes having no
larger political content at all were insulated against employer reprisal as a
75. Many of these intrusions were part of company welfare plans, intended to "uplift" their
working forces, and were often received less than enthusiastically by the intended beneficiaries. The
"service secretary" of a Maine manufacturing firm recalled the occasion when "thirty angry girls
descended on her office and declared that they were just as clean as she was and that they would not
submit to physical examinations or take off their shoes and stockings for anyone." Stuart D. Brandes,
American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940, 139 (Columbia Univ Press, 1970).
76. Richard Hofstadter & Walter P. Metzger, The Development of Academic Freedom in the United
States 209 (Columbia Univ Press, 1955).
77. Id at 275.
78. Bruce Lurie, Artisans into Workers: Labor in Nineteenth Century America (Noonday Press, 1989).
The change was graphic. An American woodcut of 1836, reproduced in Howard B. Rock, The New
York City Artisan 1789-1825 at 116 (State Univ of New York Press, 1989), depicts a turner's shop. In
the background, a boy-presumably an apprentice, perhaps the master's son-turns a wheel that
supplies power to the belting. In the left middle ground, a worker with an awl is cutting wood blanks;
and in the right foreground, another is turning the wood on the hand-powered lathe. The men are
virtually identical; both are wearing long-sleeved shirts, vests, aprons, and the high stiff hats of the
period. It is impossible to tell which is master and which is journeyman; or, perhaps, both are
journeymen, working quite independently. An oil painting of 1902 by Iwan Wladimiroff entitled
"Werkstickkontrolle" (roughly, "quality control") shows a contemporary workplace. In the
background a boy is holding a small piece of apparatus. In the foreground are two men. One,
bearded, slightly gaunt, of middle age, dressed in work clothes, applies himself to a piece of
equipment on a workbench attached to mechanically powered belting. Next to him stands another,
observing every detail of the work, dressed in grey trousers, a frock coat, vest-with gold chain, a stiff
collar and cravat; he is expressionless, hands in his pockets, smoking a cigar. At a glance one sees
immediately who is the worker and who is the boss. The painting is reproduced in Industrie Im Bild 19
(Westflisches Landesmuseum fiir Kunst und Kulturgeschichte, Miinster, 1990).
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matter of industrial liberty. 79 Analogous legislation has been adopted by a
number of states providing parallel protection for public employees. 80
The theory of industrial democracy underpinning the NLRA drew a close
connection between the employee's liberty in the workplace, including
freedom of expression on workplace issues, and the maintenance of a political
democracy. Rather than compartmentalize the industrial employee into a
worker, who must obey unquestioningly, and a citizen, who is free to question,
the reformers of the period thought the employee's habituation in the one
sphere might have consequences in the other.8 ' Thus, one could well argue
that the 1940 Statement assured for professors the protection of speech on
internal issues, as a matter of the academic freedom of institutional citizens,
that external law guaranteed to other work groups as a matter of industrial
democracy.
C. Disciplinary Discourse and Professional Autonomy
Dean Yudof concedes the claim of academic freedom in the unique
function of institutions of higher education to test, advance, and disseminate
knowledge when that claim is grounded not in personal autonomy but in
social utility. 8 2 But he has distinguished and resisted the claim when based
upon a theory of professional autonomy:
The problem is that the equation of academic freedom with a broad conception of
professionalism releases academic freedom from its conceptual moorings. The
engineer at NASA, the physician at a public hospital, and the accountant in the state
budget office have equally plausible claims to such a distended version of academic
freedom, though they are not working in the academy.
83
On such a theory of vocational freedom, he argues, professors are no different
from other employees, such as house painters. They too may lay claim to
79. 29 USC §§ 151 et seq (1988). See, for example, NLRB v Coca-Cola Co. Foods Div.,670 F2d 84
(7th Cir 1982).
80. See Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 Harv L Rev 1611, 1678-80 (1984).
81. The view was shared by Louis Brandeis: "Can this contradiction-our grand political liberty
and this industrial slavery-long coexist? Either political liberty will be extinguished or industrial
liberty must be restored." Louis D. Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness 39 (Kinnifat Press, 1934). By the
reformer and department store tycoon, A. Lincoln Filene:
And it is still harder to see how we can much longer send Jones the worker in steel or shoes
or sealing-wax to the exercise of his rights as an American, and if an industrial order in
which he is habituated to an autocratic control that was old before his country was born.
A. Lincoln Filene, A Merchant's Horizon 47 (Houghton-Mifflin, 1924). By the industrialist, John D.
Rockefeller: "Surely it is not consistent for us as Americans to demand democracy in government
and practice autocracy in industry." John D. Rockefeller, Jr. The Personal Relation in Industry 86 (Boni
& Liveright, 1923). By attorney Donald Richberg, who participated in drafting both the Railway
Labor Act, 45 USC § 151 et seq (1926), and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 USC §§ 101-115 (1932),
"To put it bluntly, an economic autocracy and a democratic government cannot support each other
long. There will be an eventual choice between the ideals of mastery and service." Donald R.
Richberg, The Rainbow 47 (Doubleday, 1936). And by Senator Robert F. Wagner: "Let men become
the servile pawns of their masters in the factories of the land and there will be destroyed the bone
and sinew of resistance to political dictatorship." Quoted in R. W. Fleming, The Significance of the
Wagner Act, in Milton Derber & Edwin Young, eds, Labor and the New Deal 121, 135 (Da Capo Press,
1972).
82. Mark G. Yudof, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 Loyola L Rev 831, 834-35 (1987).
83. Yudof, 66 Tex L Rev at 1354-55 (cited in note 6).
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professional autonomy based upon their mastery of the craft-so to require,
for example, " 'brush work' over rollers ' 84 as part of their freedom on the
job.
The distinction is important to the extent that it is grounded in the first
amendment, as Yudof's implications illustrate;8 5 but that would assume the
profession's claim of autonomy was anchored in-or seeking to be anchored
in-the constitution, the source of the arguably indistinguishable claims of
other publicly employed professionals, and of painters. However, such was
not the case.
The 1940 Statement, a pact between representatives of institutions and the
professoriate, 86 is normative. It speaks to how institutions of higher
education, public and private, ought to behave. The 1940 Statement claimed
no support in the first amendment, or in external law. Indeed, given the state
of constitutional law in 1940, it would have been difficult to fashion any such
constitutional theory at the time. 87 That kind of theorizing came later,
following Supreme Court decisions that seemed to begin to join academic
freedom with the first amendment, 88 a jointure that has, at best, been
imperfectly realized.8 9
Moreover, Dean Yudof seems to assume that other vocations have failed to
propound (and secure) analogous workplace freedom. But, as noted earlier,
before artisanal manufacture was eroded by technology and the extensive
division of labor, workers often did control a good deal of thejob. As a leader
of the painters' union in New York City lamented in 1926:
The painter has drifted, under the pressure of new building methods, from the
highly skilled craftsmanship of the past to a semi-skilled laborer. When painting was a
real craft, the men served apprenticeship, attended schools of drawing and design,
learned the nature of the pigments which are used in paints, studied the idea of the
relation of color to paints and of color harmony. They had to know the nature of the
different woods and the reaction of the various chemicals-for dyeing, finishing, etc.
84. Id at 1351.
85. This is made explicit in his earlier piece:
Is there a constitutional right to embrace an assertedly superior educational philosophy or
are we left only with recent yuppie theories of free speech, the assertion that expression
promotes self-realization? If so, why do not engineers at NASA have the constitutional right
to engineer rockets in the most efficient, productive and self-realizing manner-even if their
managers and the Congress disagree with them? To be sure, professors speak and write for
a living and engineers conceptualize problems and design solutions (a form of
communication) but why should that matter? So too, hot tubs, home ownership, and
football games, sometimes, may also promote self-realization; but constitutional
entitlements to those aspects of the good life have yet to be established.
Yudof, 32 Loyola L Rev at 840 (cited in note 82) (footnotes omitted).
86. See Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, 53 L &
Contemp Probs 3 (Summer 1990).
87. See Note, Academic Freedom and the Law, 46 Yale LJ 670 (1937).
88. William P. Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28 L & Contemp
Probs 447, 453-57 (Summer 1963), Thomas I. Emerson & David Haber, Academic Freedom of the Faculty
Member is a Citizen, 28 L & Contemp Probs 525 (Summer 1963).
89. See Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom, 66 Tex L
Rev 1265 (1988); William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court
of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, 53 L & Contemp Probs 79 (Summer 1990).
[Vol. 53: No. 3
A HIGHER ORDER OF LIBERTY
It is entirely different today. The painting business is a highly commercialized
industry. Buildings comprising hundreds of rooms must be completed in 5% of the
time it took fifteen or twenty years ago. To meet that condition, the chemist has been
brought into play. Employed by the paint manufacturer, he solves all the problems of
the contractor concerning the application of paint. The painter's job is not to reason
why; his is but the task of doing what the chemist and the contractor find it necessary
to do.
9 0
Even at the time the 1940 Statement was promulgated, organized house
painters had unilaterally adopted work rules that, among other things, did
limit the use of rollers in preference for brush work,9 ' as well as regulate the
width of the brush to be used (not more than four-and a half inches), 9 2 and,
later, limit the number of rooms per week painters would paint.9 3
Were the academic profession's appeal grounded in the authority of the
constitutional, statutory, or common law, the profession would have had to
explain why workplace liberties ought be conceded to academics that the law
did not accord to others. But in speaking to its own institutions, the
profession labored under no such obligation. 9 4  Organized painters
demanded and exercised important unilateral controls over the manner in
which their jobs would be performed, even the amount of work they would
do. Organized printers had the right to determine if there was cause to
dismiss a fellow printer, to control their supervision (even to the point of
90. Quoted in William Haber, Industrial Relations in the Building Industry 42 (Harvard Univ Press,
1930).
91. The painters' locals have adopted somewhat similar policies toward the use of the roller
as toward the spray gun, although the restrictions were much less severe in some localities.
The reasons for union opposition to the roller were more nebulous than in the case of
the spray gun. There was much resentment expressed against it as a "housewife's toy," or
"gadget," involving little skill, and hence unworthy of attention or use by a skilled
journeyman. Many union spokesmen also claimed it did a job of inferior quality for which
the union did not wish to accept responsibility.
William Haber & Harold M. Levinson, Labor Relations and Productivity in the Building Trades 125-26
(Univ of Michigan, 1956).
92. The reasons given for limiting the brush width on oil paint were two. First, oil paint is
relatively heavy, so that it imposes a fatiguing "drag" on the arm and wrist when it is
applied. Second, the painter must maintain a "wet edge," that is, he must apply the paint
continuously so that the edge of the paint does not become too dry before the next stroke is
applied; otherwise, a poor quality finish is the result. Contractors generally agreed,
therefore, that a painter cannot steadily maintain a good quality and quantity of work over a
period of time unless the width of the brush is not too great; the continued use of a too wide
brush would impose a strain, cause excessive fatigue, and result in a poorer quality finish.
In the case of water paint, a wider brush was both feasible and permitted.
Id at 164-65.
93. The latter was declared an unfair labor practice on the odd theory that the union had not
first bargained before it, rather than the employer, unilaterally changed terms of employment. New
York Dist. Council No 9, Int'l Brotherhood of Painters & Allied Trades v NLRB, 453 F2d 783 (2d Cir 1971).
94. Had the profession asserted that institutional observance of its standards was a legal
obligation imposed from without, such, for example, that an institution's violation of academic
freedom were to be a tort, Thomas A. Cowan, Interference with Academic Freedom: The Pre-Natal History of
a Tort, 4 Wayne L Rev 205 (1958), it would have to explain why faculty speech on workplace disputes
was protected while painters' speech was not. But the profession never has so asserted. It has
argued, and with considerable success, that institutional acceptance of the 1940 Statement's
conception of academic freedom becomes an express or implied obligation to the faculty. Note, The
Role of Academic Freedom in Defining the Faculty Employment Contract, 31 Case W Res L Rev 608 (1981)
(authored by Richard H. Miller).
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excluding management from the pressroom when the presses were running),
and to designate a substitute if they decided to take the day off.95 Organized
symphonic musicians have more recently secured final authority in disputed
cases of seating and tenure. 96 None of them was obliged, in order to sustain
their claims, to explain why professors could not routinely escape teaching as
a matter of right merely by designating substitutes, could not collectively
dictate the number of classes they would teach, and had nowhere achieved
final authority in cases of dismissal. Nor would we expect professors to lay
claim to these rights because painters, printers, and pianists had them.
"Questions," William Gerhardie observed, "no less than answers, can be
demonstrably wrong." 9 7 And the question-why academics should have a
"higher order of liberty in the workplace" than others-is wrong, not only
because other employees do have such liberties, but because the comparison
is irrelevant.
Of the freedoms the 1940 Statement vouchsafed, the freedom of teaching,
research, and publication remains the least controversial, perhaps for the
95. [International Typographical Union] laws which determine conditions of employment,
maximum length of work week or work day, priority, closed shop, use of reproduced
material, control over all composing room work, and other work conditions, are
nonnegotiable in local contracts. All union employers must accept all provisions of the ITU
law. Any dispute about an interpretation of such laws between an employer and his
employees can be appealed only within the political structure of the union. For example, if
an employer wishes to discharge a man with priority standing and the local union objects,
the employer can appeal the decision of the local union to the international Executive
Council of the ITU and to its annual convention if the issue in dispute involves a point of
union law. The ITU's position regarding union law is that workers have a right to set the
conditions under which they will work, and employers must accept these conditions or face
sanctions. These rigid provisions have led to many disputes with newspaper publishers and
other printing employers, but in general the ITU has been able to enforce union law.
The nature of the job control exercised by the ITU has meant that to a considerable
extent the workers run the composing room. The employers' main rights concern the way
in which work shall be done. The job, however, belongs to the man rather than to the
foreman or the shop. So strong is the workers' proprietary right to their jobs that a printer
with a regular situation designates the substitute who shall take his place if he decides to
take a day off or is obliged to take one off because of the need to cancel overtime. This rule
that a man may designate his temporary replacement has been in existence since the turn of
the century.
Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin A. Trow & James S. Coleman, Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of
the International Typographical Union 24 (The Free Press, 1956).
q6. This concession to professional musicians was adverted to in arguing that college and
university faculty members should not be held to be managerial employees under the National Labor
Relations Act:
Master Agreement of the Milwaukee Symphony Orch. 1974-1977 § 10.5 (tenured
musician may have Music Director's dismissal order reviewed by a player committee whose
decision is final and binding), Master Agreement of the Buffalo Philharmonic 1976-1977
Art. IX(d) (Auditioning Committee's Control of Reseating and Non-Renewal), Master
Agreement of the National Symphony 1973 § 6.05 (Player's Committee review of dismissal
and demotion based upon musical deficiency).
AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae at 21-22 n12, NLRB v Yeshiva University, 582 F2d 686 (2d Cir 1978)
(No 77-4182), aff'd 444 US 672 (1980).
97. William Gerhardie, God's Fifth Column 67 (Simon and Schuster, 1981). Compare Aileen S.
Kraditor, The Radical Persuasion, 1890-1917: Aspects of the Intellectual History and the Historiography of
Three American Radical Organizations (Louisiana State Univ Press, 1981) (arguing that Werner
Sombart's famous question-Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?-is wrong).
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simple reason that it is contradictory to demand that professors test, explore,
and disseminate knowledge, and then to punish them for doing precisely what
they were asked to do.98 Interestingly, even in industrial employment, an
employee discharged for doing what was expressly authorized has been
afforded a remedy.99 And the law of contract has long recognized that the
relationship may cede large areas of liberty to an employee, even if the
exercise of that liberty is in derogation of the implied obligations of servant to
master, of obedience and respectfulness. 00
IV
CONCLUSION
The critics of the profession's expansive notion of academic freedom
proceed from the idea of a core disciplinary claim, deriving from the special
function of institutions of higher education. They see the profession's
extension of the claim beyond the core, to reach speech as citizen, in Van
Alstyne's case, or speech as employee, in Yudof's, as unjustifiable; the
illegitimacy is emphasized by comparison with the liberties of nonacademics,
who have potentially greater liberty of political utterance in Van Alstyne's
analysis, and lesser liberty of intramural utterance in Yudof's. Even a writer
as sympathetic to the profession as David Rabban would shelter
"aprofessional" speech only "to give 'breathing room' to the professional
speech that is the special subject of academic freedom."'' "[L]ines," says
Yudof, "must be drawn." 0 2
The process of drawing lines, however, is not without difficulty. If a
professor draws upon the discipline in taking a political position, by what
standard is the utterance to be measured? Must a professor of chemistry
addressing a political audience in the matter of acid rain observe a more
exacting standard of accuracy than a professor of French? When is a speech
by a philosopher ever aprofessional? And to make some, but not all, speech
on matters of intramural concern an exercise of academic freedom because of
its connectedness to core faculty concerns such as curriculum and hiring, as
98. Van Alstyne, Specific Theory at 77 (cited in note 51).
99. Crowell v Transamenca Delaval, Inc., 206 NJ Super 298, 502 A2d 573 (1984); Wandry v Bull's Eye
Credit Union, 129 Wis 2d 37, 384 NW2d 325 (1986) (both based on public policy); Hammond v Heritage
Commun., Inc., 756 SW2d 152 (Ky App 1988) (based on contract); Paul v Lankenau Hosp., 375 Pa 1,
543 A2d 1148 (1988) (based on promissory estoppel).
100. An actress, for example, was held privileged to offer criticism for the betterment of the
performance:
Was respondent compelled by the contract to go through her scenes as a mere puppet
responding to the director's pull of the strings, regardless of whether or not he pulled the
right or the wrong string, or was she called upon by the language and spirit of the contract
to give an artistic interpretation of her scenes, using her intelligence, experience, artistry,
and personality to the ultimate end of securing a production of dramatic merit? We believe
that the latter is the correct interpretation.
Goudal v Cecil B. DeMille Pictures Corp., 118 Cal App 407, 410, 5 P2d 432, 433 (1931).
101. David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom
Under the First Amendment, 53 L & Contemp Probs 227 (Summer 1990).
102. Yudof, 66 Tex L Rev at 1355 (cited in note 6).
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Dean Yudof concedes,10 3 is to place the professor in the position of having to
guess where his or her utterance might lie on a spectrum from the purely
professional to the purely aprofessional. A complaint to an accrediting
association? A protest of unfair treatment of a colleague? An expression of
lack of confidence in the administration?
More important, the architects of the American idea of academic freedom
declined the invitation to engage in line drawing, not only as a potential trap
for the unwary, but as an activity at odds with the theory of the profession they
propounded. They, like the Progressive reformers' connection of political
with industrial democracy, saw the professor as an uncompartmentalized
whole, in consequence of which no hierarchical significance was attached to
the category of utterance, no core identified from which some, but not other,
emanations could be derived.
One does find in their theory a concern for the profession's dignity and
self-respect. 0 4 But these did not derive from an anachronistic "yuppie theory
of free speech";' 0 5 the claim was not premised upon any notion of "self-
realization."'10 6 It was an assertion of the total condition of freedom under
which the profession best performed and, importantly, of the kinds of persons
it is most desirable to attract. 0 7 If there is an historical antecedent, it may be
the pre-industrial artisanal ideal. The mechanic of the new Republic asserted
simultaneously an independence of craftsmanship that brooked no
supervision,' 0 8 a vigorous defense of workplace rights-of artisanal dignity
103. Id.
104. Matthew W. Finkin, Intramural Speech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amendment, 66 Tex L Rev
1323, 1342-43 (1988).
105. Yudof, 32 Loyola L Rev at 840 (cited in note 82).
106. Yudof, 66 Tex L Rev at 1356 (cited in note 6).
107. As the 1915 Declaration put it:
The . . .conception of a university as an ordinary business venture, and of academic
teaching as a purely private employment, manifests also a radical failure to apprehend the
nature of the social function discharged by the professional scholar. . . . [I]t is to the public
interest that the professorial office should be one both of dignity and of independence.
If education is the corner stone of the structure of society and if progress in scientific
knowledge is essential to civilization, few things can be more important than to enhance the
dignity of the scholar's profession, with a view to attracting into its ranks men of the highest
ability, of sound learning, and of strong and independent character.
Richard Hofstadler & Wilson Smith, eds, 2 American Higher Education: A Documentary History 860, 864
(Univ of Chicago Press, 1961); see Appendix A, 53 L & Contemp Probs 393, 396 (Summer 1990). As
Arthur 0. Lovejoy was later to opine concerning a college president's demand that faculty members
who disagreed with him should leave:
The position and utterances of President Holt .. .were, in the Committee's opinion, a
manifest infringement of academic freedom, though the issue over which it took place was
an educational rather than a theological, political, or economic one. . . . No teacher having
a high degree of professional self-respect is, the Committee believes, likely to accept service
in an institution in which freedom of individual opinion, and the exercise of professional
responsibility, on educational matters is denied in the degree in which it was denied by
President Holt on this occasion.
Lovejoy, 19 AAUP Bull at 421-22 (cited in note 3).
108. Marc Linder has explained the law of respondeat superior at the time of the 1915
Declaration: "Where the worker possessed a skill the employer did not possess and could not
integrate into its business, courts held the workers to be pursuing an independent ... calling." Marc
Linder, Towards Universal 'orker Coverage Under the National Labor Relations Act: Making Room for
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and self-respect-and a robust liberty of political association and expression.
It was this very combination of attributes that was taken by the mechanical
class to distinguish it, as "free labor," from apprenticeship, domestic service,
indentured servitude, and slavery. Rather than claiming a novel "higher
order of workplace liberty" for professors, the 1940 Statement resonates
against an older ideal, one to which the nation may be returning in some
aspects of the unfolding law of employment.
Uncontrolled Employees, Dependent Contractors, and Employee-Like Persons, 66 U Det L Rev 555, 570 (1989).
See also Marc Linder, The Employment Relationship in Anglo-American Law: A Historical Perspective 142-
143 (Greenwood Press, 1989). In other words, despite the obvious fact of an employment
relationship, for the purpose of vicarious liability the employee was not legally to be thought of in
those terms because of the employer's inability to control the employee's work. Judge Cardozo
applied that body of law to case of alleged professorial negligence in the conduct of a laboratory
experiment:
The governing body of a university makes no attempt to control its professors and
instructors as if they were its servants. By practice and tradition, the members of the faculty
are masters, and not servants, in the conduct of the classroom. They have the independence
appropriate to a company of scholars.
Hamburger v Cornell University, 240 NY 328, 336, 148 NE 539, 541 (1925).

